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Abstract
The increase in dollarisation in Cambodia has been contrary to the general belief that
macroeconomic and political stability help reduce dollarisation. We provide so far the
first explanation for this counterfactual phenomenon. In doing so, this paper develops
a theoretical model based on the framework of Uribe (1997) by including a dollar pricing
index to amplify the network effects of using a foreign currency (denoted dollar). The
dollar pricing index, a proportion of an economy denominated by the dollar, reduces
the dollar’s transaction cost, thus increasing its usage in the economy. This increased
use of the dollar further improves the experience of using it, hence results in higher
usage of dollar in the price quotation. The positive interaction of using the dollar as
a unit of account and a means of payment causes dollarisation continues to rise, even
though the economy has achieved low inflation and political stability.
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“In Cambodia, the Ghosts Prefer Dollars."
— The New York Times (2016)
1 Introduction
The US dollar is a dominant currency in Cambodia instead of its currency, Riel. When
economies such as Cambodia use a foreign currency in parallel to or instead of their own
currencies (as a result of high inflation), this financial adaptation is known as dollarisation.
The general belief about the evolution of dollarisation is that with dollarised economies ex-
perience macroeconomic and political stability for extended periods of time, their level of
dollarisation gradually declines (Menon, 2008). For instance, as Laos P.D.R. and Vietnam
have achieved an average annual economic growth of about 7% and inflation of about 6%
along with political stability over the last two decades, their degrees of dollarisation have
respectively reduced from 32% and 75% in 2001 to 8% and 48% in 2017. Somewhat paradox-
ically, although Cambodia has had similar experience during the same period, its dollarisa-
tion trend has continued to rise from 35% in 1993 to 84% in 2017 (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Trends of dollarisation in Cambodia, Laos P.D.R. and Vietnam


















Note: Degree of dollarisation is a ratio of dollar-denominated deposits to broad
money (M2). Data were sourced from the International Monetary Fund Country
Reports (Appendix A).
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To help explain this upward trend of dollarisation in Cambodia, Menon (2008) offers three
possible factors: exports, inflows of foreign direct investments (FDI), and aid. Yet, the data
(Figure A1) do not actually support this conjecture. In Vietnam, the total averages of these
three factors from 2000 to 2017 accounted for about 83% of the country’s gross domestic
product (GDP), which was higher than in Cambodia. However, whereas Vietnam’s dollarisa-
tion has expectantly shown a downward trend, Cambodia’s dollarisation has increased.
For the sake of understanding the causes behind this phenomenon, this paper extends Uribe
(1997) cash-in-advance model by including a dollar pricing index, defined as a proportion
of an economy that quotes the dollar as a unit of account. The inclusion of this variable
amplifies the network effects of using the dollar in an economy.
The network effects are the central feature in Uribe (1997) model to explain dollarisation
dynamics in developing countries.1 In his model, Uribe (1997) assumes that an economy’s
accumulated experience in using the dollar as a medium of exchange acts an externality that
lowers the transaction cost of buying goods with dollars. However, the network effects would
be far more significant if dollar quotations were included2 because dollar-denominated goods
promote and ease dollar usage. Therefore, the inclusion of the dollar pricing index further
reduces the transaction cost of buying goods with the dollar, increasing its usage in an econ-
omy. The higher usage of dollar then improves the knowledge of using it, encouraging the
economy to quote the prices in dollars. The interaction between the use of the dollar in the
price quotation and the accumulated experience of using it increases the degree of dollari-
sation, even though the economy has achieved social, political, and economic stability.
Two waves of survey data3 in Cambodia along with qualitative data from Laos P.D.R., Viet-
nam, and Peru, support this augmented model’s prediction. With the increasing use of for-
eign currencies as an unit of account in Cambodia, the use of foreign currencies as a medium
1Uribe (1997) model shows that a temporary high inflation triggers an economy to adopt the dollar. Because
of the network effects, the degree of dollarisation declines gradually when the inflation stabilises in the
economy. This model explains well the dynamics of dollarisation in most developing countries; however,
it can not explain the evolution of dollarisation in Cambodia - Dollarisation trend continues to rise, even
though Cambodia’s inflation has stabilised.
2Some dollarised economies, such as Laos P.D.R. Vietnam, and Peru, officially ban a foreign currency from
being used as a unit of account, while another like Cambodia does not forbid such a role of foreign currency
in its economy.
3The first survey was conducted by Khou (2012) in 2010 with a sample of 1106 local merchants, and the second
one was conducted by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) and JICA research institute in 2014-2015 with
a sample of 856 enterprises.
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of exchange also grows. Over the period 2010-2014, the dollar pricing index and the degree
of dollarisation have increased from 28% to 43% and 81% to 83%, respectively. This posi-
tive relationship was also observed in Cambodia’s cross-regional areas. Figure 2 shows that
the higher the dollar pricing index a region has, the larger proportion of revenue in foreign
currencies the region receives.




















































Dollar pricing index Percentage of foreign currencies in revenue
Note: The dollar pricing index is measured by a proportion of products that merchants quote their
prices in foreign currencies. The data were retrieved from National Bank of Cambodia (2016, p.53-
58).
While Cambodia has no restrictions on which currency is used to quote prices, Laos P.D.R.,
Vietnam, and Peru have banned foreign currencies from being used as a unit of account.
The ban has decreased the dollar pricing index, thus raising the cost of using the dollar in
transactions, which further reduced the use of dollars in transaction. As a consequence,
the degree of dollarisation in these countries has gradually declined, as predicted by Uribe
(1997) model.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature con-
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cerning with currency risk and network externalities as the roots of dollarisation. Section
3 briefly discusses the dollarisation in Cambodia. Section 4 develops a model of currency
substitution. Section 5 discusses the effects of government policies including how changes
in depreciation rate (or inflation), dollar pricing index, or both affect the equilibrium. Sec-
tion 6 provides some qualitative evidence to support the model’s predictions, and Section 7
concludes the paper with policy implications and model limitation.
2 Currency Risk and Network Externalities
The present study is related to two main strands of literature. One is concerned with how
currency risk triggers the use of a foreign currency. The other focuses on the network exter-
nalities of using a foreign currency to help explain the evolution of dollarisation in develop-
ing countries.
Craig and Waller (2004) and Camera et al. (2004) develop a model in which households use
both domestic and foreign currencies in their transactions. Because the domestic currency
is perceived to have a relatively high probability of losing its value before its use in a trans-
action, households tend to use and accept the foreign one instead. However, because using
the foreign currency incurs a transaction cost, the domestic one still remains a medium of
exchange. The inclusion of the transaction cost in the model is motivated by the fact that
in developing countries, households might need to verify the authenticity of an unfamil-
iar currency (Engineer, 2000; Tandon and Wang, 2003), and spend time switching between
currencies (Guidotti and Rodriguez, 1992).
These two factors – currency risk and transaction cost – lead to the coexistence of both cur-
rencies in the economy, which neither supports nor contradicts Gresham’s Law that risky
money drives safe money out of the economy (Rolnick and Weber, 1986). Although they
are offsetting factors in explaining the extent of currency substitution, yet the studies by
Melvin and Fenske (1992) and Clements and Schwartz (1993) show that the effects of a de-
crease in currency risk are weaker in an economy that has already experienced a history of
exchange rate instability, implying that de-dollarisation might not occur or may be slow in
such economies.
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Based on the idea that using a foreign currency incurs a transaction cost, Uribe (1997) de-
velops a simple cash-in-advance model, to which this paper is the closest. In his model, the
network externalities play a central role in explaining the continued existence of the foreign
currency in an economy once it has already been widely used as a medium of exchange.
In other words, the more experience an economy has with using the foreign currency as a
medium of exchange, the lower its transaction cost becomes. These network effects are also
present in the search theoretical models of money (see e.g. Matsuyama et al., 1993; Trejos
and Wright, 1995). Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) show that even an item without any intrinsic
value can become a means of payment if widely accepted as such. Then, the use of such a
thing fundamentally becomes the norm. This indicates that if a foreign currency is broadly
used during a period of high inflation, its use will continue after inflation returns to a lower
level.
Empirically, the network effects on hysteresis have been supported in several studies. For
instance, Valev (2010) uses survey data to examine the impacts of currency risk and network
externalities as causes of hysteresis of currency substitution in Bulgaria. He finds the net-
work externalities to be a major factor of hysteresis (see also Duffy and Ochs, 2002; Samreth,
2011).
3 The Dollarisation in Cambodia
The currency risk and network externalities are the roots of rising dollarisation in Cambo-
dia. Cambodians had already lost trust in the domestic currency (riel) when the riel and
economic institutions (e.g. banks) among others were abolished during the Khmer Rouge
regime, known as the Cambodia Genocide, from 1975 to 1979. In March 1980, the riel was
introduced back into the economy. Yet, people preferred barter and gold for most domestic
transactions (De Zamaroczy and Sa, 2002). This loss of confidence in the riel was further
eroded by the fact that the riel became highly depreciated against the dollar during the pe-
riod 1988-1991.
In the early 1990s, the usage of US dollar grew rapidly as Cambodia was open to foreign in-
vestments and aid. The United Nations Transitional Authority spent around USD 1.7 billion
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– around 75% of Cambodia’s GDP at that time – on rents and local services for its peacekeep-
ing operations including assisting Cambodia with its first national election in 1993 (National
Bank of Cambodia, 2016, p.8).
Figure 3: The use of foreign currencies across regions in Cambodia
Note: Revenue dollarisation is a fraction of foreign currencies in revenues. The US dollar is used pre-
dominantly in two cities – Phnom Penh and Siem Reap. The US dollar and Thai currency (baht) are
widely used along the northeast and southwest border with Thailand. The US dollar and the Viet-
namese dong are frequently seen along the southeast border with Vietnam. In other regions, which
are mainly rural, the domestic currency (riel) is predominant. Source: National Bank of Cambodia
(2016, p.53–58).
For the sake of price stability and economic growth, Cambodia has placed no restrictions
on the use of foreign currencies, thus leading multiple currencies to be in use. The type of
currency used as a means of payment is positively associated with the type of currency used
as a unit of account. For instance, as merchants in Phnom Penh City use the US dollar to
display prices for approx 65% of their total products, they also receive around 69% of their
revenues in the US dollars (Figure 2). Moreover, the type of currency used in price quotation
depends mainly on types of goods and services4, and whom Cambodians do business with.
As a result, the degree of dollarisation differs across regions, and concentrates in urbane
4e.g. The US dollar is predominantly used to quote salaries and pay employees in the private sector as well as
international organisations, and for big-ticket items, such as houses and vehicles.
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areas, tourism sites and near trade borders (Figure 3).
Since Cambodia was increasingly integrated into the world in the early 1990s, it has per-
formed spectacularly (e.g. its average annual GDP growth is around 7%), but it has made it
easy for foreign currencies to be used because products have been quoted in a foreign cur-
rency. Hence, the degree of dollarisation has increased from 35% in 1993 to 84% in 2017.
This upward trend of dollarisation in Cambodia appears to be the odd one out among other
dollarised economies. To the best of our knowledge, the theoretical model we develop in
the next section is a first effort towards a formal way to explain this counterfactual phe-
nomenon.
4 Model
The theoretical framework is a cash-in-advance model, as presented in Uribe (1997). Dif-
fering from Uribe (1997), we introduce the role of a foreign currency as a unit of account
to amplify the network effects of using the foreign currency. In addition, we incorporate a
government’s degree of regulations on the use of the foreign currency in price quotation.
These inclusions are motivated by observations in dollarised economies: Some dollarised
economies, such as Laos P.D.R., Vietnam, and Peru, officially ban a foreign currency from
being used as a unit of account, while Cambodia allows such a role of foreign currency in its
economy.5
The economy is a small open dual-currency system, in which a foreign currency, denoted
dollar, is used along with a domestic currency, riel. This economy is endowed and popu-
lated by a large number of infinitely lived, identical households whose preferences are de-
fined over paths of consumption, {Ct }
∞




e−ρtU (Ct )d t , (1)
5We have data of only these four countries about using a foreign currency as a unit of account. For other
dollarised economies, we could not find any document that shows whether they have allowed a foreign
currency to be used in the price quotation.
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where ρ is a discount rate and U (·) is an instantaneous utility function which is assumed to
be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. Consumption is a





where u(·) is assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly con-
cave, and to satisfy lim
c→0
uc (0) =∞. The condition uc (0) =∞ implies that a consumption of
every type of good θ is always positive: c(θ) > 0.
Households can use either riels or dollars to pay for goods. However, using dollars incurs a
transaction cost that differs across goods θ. That is, the unit transaction cost of buying good
θ with dollars is φ(θ,kt , qt ). The variable kt represents the economy’s accumulated experi-
ence at time t with using dollars as a medium of exchange, and it is referred to as dollarisa-
tion capital. The variable qt ∈ [0,1] – referred to as dollar pricing index – is a proportion of
products that merchants quote their prices in dollars:6 q = 0 means that all products’ prices
are displayed in the local currency, riel; q = 1 indicates all prices are quoted in the foreign
currency, dollar. This dollar pricing index indicates the economy’s accumulated experience
at time t with using dollars as a unit of account (The variable q is the main feature that this
paper contributes relative to Uribe (1997)’s work.7). While the paths of kt and qt are taken
as given, both variables are endogenously determined and positively reinforcing each other
at the aggregate level. The function φ(θ,kt , qt ) satisfies the following assumption:
Assumption 1. φ : [0,1]×ℜ+× [0,1] →ℜ+ is non-negative, twice continuously differentiable,





φq = 0, and lim
θ→1
φ(θ,k, q) =∞.
Assumption 1 states that the transaction cost is strictly increasing in θ, and becomes in-
finitely large as θ approaches 1. This prohibitive cost ensures that there always exists a
positive demand for the domestic currency. But the transaction cost is strictly decreasing
6Cambodia’s survey data show that q was 28% in 2010 and 43% in 2014 for the economy as a whole.
7If we relabel q and k as one variable to capture an economy’s accumulated experience in using a foreign
currency, the model is unable to explain the dollarisation phenomenon in Cambodia because there is no
reinforcing mechanism to amplify the network effects of using a foreign currency.
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in both kt and qt . This decreased cost is used to capture the network externalities resulting





φq = 0 is for technical convenience when characterising a steady state.
There exist only two types of markets in this endowed economy: financial market and goods
market. As in Lucas (1982), the financial market opens first, and the goods market opens
only after the former closes. At time t , households hold a stock of riel-denominated wealth
Wt . With this amount of money, they go to the financial market to obtain their desired bal-
ance of dollars (dt ) and riels (Mt ) with a nominal exchange rate (Et ). This exchange rate –
expressed as units of riels per unit of dollars – is set by the government. In addition, they
can buy or sell an internationally traded, dollars-denominated bond, bt , at the price of one
dollar per unit. This bond bears the constant real interest rate r > 0 in dollars at time t . We
assume strict purchasing power parity and perfect capital mobility to ensure that this is the
real interest rate in both the domestic economy and the world. Denoting wt ≡ Wt /Et and
mt ≡ Mt /Et , the household’s budget constraint in dollars is given by:
wt = bt +mt +dt . (2)
As the goods market opens, one member of the household goes to purchase the desired
amount of each good θ, while another member receives an endowment of yt units of each
good θ. All goods θ are traded internationally at the common price of one dollar or E per
unit. When selling their goods, producers can accept either riels or dollars. If they take
riels, they have to wait until the financial market opens to convert riels into dollars. Denote
Θdt and Θ
m
t as the set of goods the household purchases with dollars and riels at time t ,
respectively, the household faces the cash-in-advance constraints to purchase goods with















where πt ≡ Ėt /Et is the depreciation rate (or inflation rate) at time t that needs to satisfy
(1+ r )(1+πt ) > 1 so that there is always a cost of liquidity of services provided by currency
holdings (a nominal interest rate i > 0). Moreover, household does not have any debt after
exiting the economy: lim
t→∞
e−tr wt ≥ 0. Denoting τt ≡ Tt /Et to be the government’s transfers
to households in terms of dollars, the household’s evolution of real wealth is given by:












ct (θ)dθ+ yt +τt . (5)








t=0 to maximise its
lifetime utility Equation (1) subject to the constraints Equations (2)-(5) by taking as given the
initial wealth (wo) and paths
[
πt , qt ,kt , yt
]∞
t=0 and satisfying the No-Ponzi condition. The
first-order conditions associated with the household’s optimisation problem are Equations
(3)-(5) binding and (hereafter, we drop time subscripts when no risk of confusion arises)
Θd = [0, θ̄(k, q ,π)), (6)
Θm = [θ̄(k, q ,π),1], (7)








0 if φ(0,k, q) ≥π
θ such that φ(θ,k, q) =π otherwise
(8)
c(θ) = c(θ̄(k, q ,π)) for θ ∈Θm , (9)
uc (c(θ(k, q ,π)))
1+φ(θ,k, q)
=
uc (c(θ̄(k, q ,π)))
1+π
for θ ∈Θd , (10)
λ̇=λ[ρ− r ], (11)
UC (C )uc (c(θ(k, q ,π))) =λ[1+φ(θ,k, q)][1+ r ] for θ ∈Θ
d . (12)
Equations (6) and (7) show that there exists a cut-off good θ̄(k, q ,π) ∈ [0,1] at time t , such
that goods with index θ ≥ θ̄(k, q ,π) are bought with riels and the rest with dollars (Figure
4). This cut-off good is referred to as the degree of dollarisation at time t . Equation (8)
shows that when the degree of dollarisation is positive, it is given by the good whose cost
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is the same whether it is purchased with dollars or with riels. Assumption 1 implies that
θ̄(k, q ,π) is continuous and any triple (k, q ,π) such that θ̄(k, q ,π) > 0, θ̄(k, q ,π) is strictly
increasing in all three arguments, continuously differentiable, and strictly concave in k and
q (Figure 5). Equations (9) and (10) state that c(θ) is continuous and strictly decreasing
in θ for θ ∈ Θd , and constant for θ ∈ Θm . Equation (11) implies that λ – the shadow price
of wealth related to flow constraint Equation (5) – is constant over time because the interest
rate equals the discount rate at the steady state. Equation (12) shows that the marginal utility
of consumption of the goods bought with dollars is equal to the product of the shadow price
of wealth and the effective price of the goods. This effective price equals to its direct cost
(1+φ) plus the opportunity cost of holding (1+φ) units of dollars required by the dollar
cash-in-advance constraint to buy one unit of goods.
















θ̄(k2, q ,π2)π1 <π2
k1 < k2
Following Uribe (1997), we postulate the dollarisation capital k and the dollar pricing index
q to evolve respectively as follows:
k̇ = f (θ̄(k, q ,π))−δk k, (13)
q̇ = h(θ̄(k, q ,π))− (δq +η)q , (14)
where ẋ is the time derivative of x, δx refers the depreciation rate of x; η refers to the degree
of government regulations on using the dollar as a unit of account, and f (·) and h(·) satisfy
the following assumption.
Assumption 2. f and h : [0,1] →ℜ+ are continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and
strictly concave, with f (0) = 0 and h(0) = 0.
Assumption 2 states that as more people use dollars for purchasing goods, the amount of
dollars circulating the economy and the proportion of the economy that quotes prices in
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dollars increases. That is, there is social learning by doing in the process of adopting dollars
as a legal tender. The depreciation rates δk ∈ (0,1] and δq ∈ (0,1] together with f (0) = 0 and
h(0) mean that the stock of dollarisation and that of the dollar pricing index gradually de-
crease as the dollar is no longer used in the economy – the economy as a whole forgets how
to use the dollar. The degree of regulations η captures the effects of government interven-
tion in the use of the dollar in price quotation. The more stringent the regulations, the faster
the fall of the dollar pricing index. For analytical convenience, η is assumed to be between 0
and 1 and satisfy η+δq ∈ (0,1].
The Steady-State Equilibrium
To simplify and characterise the steady state, Equations (13) and (14) can be rewritten as
k̇ = F (k, q ,π)−δk k, (15)
q̇ = H(k, q ,π)− (δq +η)q , (16)
where F and H are the composites of functions f and θ, and h and θ, respectively. Assump-
tion 2 together with the fact that θ is strictly increasing and concave in k and q implies that
F and H are also strictly increasing and concave in k and q .
A steady-state equilibrium is defined by the stock of dollarisation and that of the dollar pric-
ing index (k∗, q∗), which satisfy the following two equations:
F (k∗, q∗,π)−δk k
∗ = 0, (17)
H(k∗, q∗,π)− (δq +p)q
∗ = 0. (18)
This steady-state equilibrium (k∗, q∗) is globally and uniquely stable. To see this heuristi-
cally, consider Figure 6, drawn in the (k, q) space. The curves k̇ = 0 and q̇ = 0, corresponding
respectively to Equations (17) and (18), have a positive slope so that a higher dollar price
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index is associated with a higher dollarisation capital in equilibrium. Moreover, the slope of
k̇ = 0 curve is steeper than that of q̇ = 0 curve at the equilibrium.










To show that these statements are true, first consider the slope of k̇ = 0 curve in the (k, q)








δk −Fk (k, q ,π)
Fq (k, q ,π)
, (19)
where Fk ≡ ∂F /∂k and Fq ≡ ∂F /∂q . Equation (15) implies that δk = F (q ,k,π)/k as k̇ = 0. The
fact that F is strictly concave in k and F (0, q ,π) ≥ 0 yields the following inequality:
F (k, q ,π) > Fk (k, q ,π)k +F (0, q ,π)
> Fk (k, q ,π)k.
This inequality leads to δk−Fk (k, q ,π) > 0, thus proving that Equation (19) is strictly positive.
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Similarly, when the same method and argument are applied to Equation (16), the slope of








Hk (k, q ,π)
δq +η−Hk (k, q ,π)
. (20)
Second, to show that the slope of k̇ = 0 curve is steeper than that of q̇ = 0 curve at the equi-





















(F −kFk )(H −q Hq ) − qkFq Hk > 0
m
kHk (F −kFk −qFq )+qFq (H −kHk −q Hq ) + (F −kFk −qFq )(H −kHk −q Hq ) > 0.
The second line is a result of substituting F (k∗, q∗,π)/k∗ forδk in Equation (19) and H(k
∗, q∗,π)/q∗
for δq +η in Equation (20). The third and last lines result from simplifying and rearranging
the terms in the second line (note that all functions are evaluated at the equilibrium point).
Assumptions 1 and 2 together with Equation (8) show that this inequality is satisfied (see
proof in Appendix B).
Third, the dynamic movements of k and q are dictated by the signs of the time derivatives
of k and q , respectively. Since ∂k̇/∂q = Fq > 0, all the points below the k̇ = 0 curve are
characterised by k̇ < 0 and all the points above the curve by k̇ > 0. Similarly, because ∂q̇/∂k =
Hk > 0, all the points to the left of the q̇ = 0 curve are characterised by q̇ < 0 and all the points
to the right of the curve by q̇ > 0. Therefore, the k̇ = 0 curve and q̇ = 0 curve divide the phase
space into four regions, each with its own distinct pairing of signs of k̇ and q̇ , as indicated
by the right-angled directional arrows in Figure 6.
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Finally, since this paper focuses on developing economies that have already experienced
high inflation, the steady-state stock of dollarisation as shown by Uribe (1997) is positive
while the dollar pricing index is 0 (q = 0). This steady-state stock is denoted by k̄ in Figure
6. At the point (k̄,0,π), the q̇ = 0 curve lies above the k̇ = 0 curve because q̇ = F (k̄,0,π) is
greater than 0 (θ(k0,0,π) > 0). Assumption 1 implies that as q approaches to 1, the slope of
the k̇ = 0 curve approaches to infinity. Likewise, k approaches to infinity, the slope of q̇ = 0
approaches to 0.
Therefore, the two demarcation curves (k̇ = 0 and q̇ = 0) intersect only once at point E(k∗, q∗).
This point is the globally stable equilibrium because regardless of where a point (k, q) starts,
it tends to move toward point E as indicated by the directional arrows.
5 The Effects of Government Policies
In this section, we illustrate how changes in government policies affect the steady-state equi-
librium and present three relevant cases to explain the rise and fall of the degree of dollari-
sation in developing countries.
5.1 The Effects of Changes in Inflation
First, consider what happens to the equilibrium when a government reduces inflation. Em-
pirically, when high-inflation countries decreased the inflation rate to a low level for a cer-
tain period of time, their dollarisation has gradually declined (see e.g. Figure 10 and Figure
A.2). Figure 7 explains how this mechanism works.
A decrease in inflation causes the k̇ = 0 curve to shift to the left, from the k̇0 = 0 curve to the
k̇1 = 0 curve; but the q̇ = 0 curve moves downward, from the q̇0 = 0 curve to the q̇1 = 0 curve.



















δq +η−Hq (k, q ,π)
> 0.
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Now the economy is governed by the new curves k̇1 = 0 and q̇1 = 0. At the point E0, both q
∗
0
and k∗0 are at such a high level that they cannot generate enough social learning by adopting
the foreign currency to compensate for their depreciation. Hence, both stocks gradually
decline through a stable saddle path E0E1 until they reach a new steady state at point E1,
where the new level of both stocks are lower than before.













5.2 The Effects of Changes in Dollar Quotation
Next, consider how the equilibrium changes when a government imposes restrictions on
dollar quotation. Restricting the use of the dollar as a unit of account affects only the q̇ = 0
curve, making the stock of the dollar pricing index depreciate more quickly. In other words,
if the other variables remain the same, an increase in η – the degree of regulations on the use









δq +η−Hq (k, q ,π)
< 0.
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As the curve q̇ = 0 shifts downward, from the q̇0 = 0 curve to the q̇1 = 0 curve (Figure 8), the
equilibrium moves along a stable saddle path E0E1 from the point E0 to the point E1, where
the stock of dollarisation and dollar pricing index capitals are lower than before.













5.3 The Effects of Changes in Inflation and Dollar Quotation
Finally, consider a case in which a government has lowered inflation but has relaxed re-
strictions on using the dollar as a unit of account. Melvin and Fenske (1992), Clements and
Schwartz (1993), and Valev (2010) provide evidence that the effects of network externalities
are stronger than those of currency risk. This evidence implies that the shift of the q̇ = 0
curve (from the q̇0 = 0 to the q̇1 = 0), as shown in Figure 9, is larger than that of the k̇ = 0
curve (from the k̇0 = 0 to k̇1 = 0). Since the point E0 is below both new curves, the stock
of dollarisation initially declines, but that of dollar pricing index increases along the stable
saddle path E0E1E2 from E0 to E1. From E1 onward, both stocks gradually rise to reach the
new equilibrium at the point E2, where the level of both stocks are higher than before.
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6 The Model Predictions and Evidence
The illustrations Figure 7 to 9 suggest the explanations behind the upward trend of dollar-
isation in Cambodia and the downward trends in Laos, Vietnam, and Peru. Since its first
national election in 1993, Cambodia has maintained an average depreciation rate of the riel
around 2%. However, the Cambodian government has acquiesced to the use of dollar, and
has had no restrictions on how foreign currencies are used. In particular, the government
has not imposed any regulation on which currency is used to quote products’ prices (Kubo,
2017). This implies that η – the degree of regulations on using the dollar for price quotation
– approaches to 0. Because the network externalities of using the dollar are proved stronger
than the currency risk, the dollarisation degree has increased (Table 1 and Figure 10).
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Table 1: Regulations on dollarisation in four selected countries
Quotation of Prices in Foreign Currency
Cambodia No control
Laos P.D.R. In 1990, Laos issued Decree No53/CM to prohibit the use of foreign currency
for domestic transactions, but it was not strictly enforced. In March 2008, the
decree was upgraded for stringent enforcement with penalties.
Vietnam Vietnam banned (but did not strictly enforce) foreign currency for quoting
prices in the 1990s. In 2011, the restriction was upgraded to raise the penal-
ties to a maximum of VND 500 million.
Peru In 2004, Peru enacted a law stipulating that all prices be denominated in soles,
the local currency.
Note: Data for Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos P.D.R. are sourced from Kubo (2017), and data for Peru
are obtained from Castellares et al. (2019).
In contrast, Laos P.D.R., Vietnam, and Peru have repeatedly restricted their economies by
forbidding price quotations in foreign currency. For instance, as in Cambodia, it has been
a common practice in Laos P.D.R. for firms and households to use foreign currencies as a
means of exchange and unit of account instead of its local currency, the kip. The use of
the Thai baht and the U.S. dollar is common throughout the country, particularly in urban
areas, tourism sites, and Thailand’s border. However, in the 2000s, the Laotian government
imposed regulations on dollar-denominated bank lending and prohibited pricing in dollars.
To enforce the regulations, the Bank of the Laos P.D.R. even establish a committee to conduct
regular inspections to monitor the price quotation of products in markets, shops, compa-
nies, and trade fairs or exhibitions (Kubo, 2017). This regulation has increased the cost of
using the foreign currency. The increased cost and low depreciation rates in Laos P.D.R.,
Vietnam, and Peru, have reduced the degree of dollarisation in these economies (Table 1
and Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Depreciation rate and dollarisation in four selected countries






























































































































Note: The degree of dollarisation is a ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money (M2). The data to construct dollarisation are sourced from various




In this paper, we provide so far the first explanation for the puzzle of dollarisation in Cam-
bodia. To do so, we develop a theoretical model based on the framework of Uribe (1997) by
introducing a new stock variable, dollar pricing index, and a degree of government regula-
tions on the stock variable. This index, defined as a proportion of an economy that uses a
foreign currency (denoted dollar) as a unit of account, amplifies the network effects of the
dollar usage. Because the impacts of the network externalities have proven to be more sub-
stantial than those of currency risk, the positive interaction between the use of the dollar as
a unit of account and a medium of exchange raises dollar usage, even though Cambodia has
achieved economic and political stability.
Our model has important implications for dollarised economies. To reduce the widespread
use of a foreign currency, dollarised economies need to stabilise not only their macroeco-
nomic conditions (e.g. reduce inflation) but also increase the transaction cost of the use of
the foreign currency (significantly restricting the foreign currency from being used as a unit
of account because foreign currency-denominated goods explicitly promote the use of the
foreign currency).
Our model has one limitation, though: it produces only one stable steady state; hence, it
cannot capture the hysteresis of dollarisation as Uribe (1997) model which provides two sta-
ble, steady states and one unstable steady state. However, since our work focuses on the
developing countries that had already experienced high inflation and thus a certain degree
of dollarization, our model suffices to deal with the present objective: Explain whether this
particular degree of dollarisation continues to rise or fall as a result of government’s regula-
tions on the use of a foreign currency as a unit of account.
Declaration of conflict of interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Data sources used to construct dollarisation in eight selected countries
Sources
Cambodia IMF Staff Country Reports: No. 95/108, No. 99/33, No. 00/134, No. 06/265, No.
09/325, No. 11/45, No. 14/33, and No. 18/369.
Laos IMF Staff Country Reports: No. 96/54, No. 98/77, No. 3, No. 02/62, No. 04/394,
No. 06/398, No. 08/340, No. 11/44, No. 13/369, No. 15/45, and No. 17/53.
Vietnam IMF Staff Country Reports: No. 95/93, No. 99/56, No. 03/382, No. 07/386, No.
12/165, No. 16/240, and No. 18/215.
Peru IMF Staff Country Reports: No. 95/108 , No. 99/33 , No. 00/160, No. 06/265 ,
No. 09/325 , No. 11/45 , No. 14/33 , and No. 18/369.
Argentina IMF Staff Country Reports: No. 95/110, No. 98/38, No. 00/134 , No. 03/226, No.
05/236, No. 17/409.
Bolivia IMF Staff Country Reports: No. 95/24, No. 97/99, No. 00/38, No. 03/258, No.
05/393, No. 07/248, No. 10/27, No. 12/149, No. 15/334, and No. 18/379.
Turkey IMF Staff Country Reports: No. 96/112, No. 00/14, No. 02/138, No. 05/163, No.
07/362, No. 10/278, No. 13/363, No. 16/104, and No. 18/110.
Uruguay IMF Staff Country Reports: No. 95/75, No. 99/102, No. 01/183, No. 04/327, No.
06/425, No. 08/45 , No. 10/43, No. 14/6, 15/81, and No. 18/23.
Note: Dollarisation is a ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money (M2). Data for Cambodia
are supplemented by the data from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Cambodia, where the
author Veasna Kheng worked as an economist in 2015.




















Exports Inflows of FDI Aid
Note: The selection of sample period is based on data availability. Aid is
“Net official development assistance and official aid received". The data
are retrieved from the World Development Indicators (2019).
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Figure A2: Depreciation rate and dollarization in Argentina, Bolivia, Turkey and Uruguay































































































































Note: The degree of dollarization is a ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money (M2). The data to construct dollarization are sourced from various




The following proof responds to inequality (21). First, rewrite the expression (F −Fk k)(H −
Hq q)−Fq Hk qk as:
(F −Fk k −Fq q)(H −Hk k −Hq q)+Hk k(F −Fk k −Fq q)+Fq q(H −Hk k −Hq q)
Next, show that the terms in parentheses are positive. The assumption 1 implies that
φθ[θ2 −θ1]+φk [k2 −k1]+φq [q2 −q1] >φ(θ2,k2, q2)−φ(θ1,k1, q1); ∀π, (B.1)
where k2 > k1 and q2 > q1 and thus θ2 > θ1 (θ strictly increases in k and q). Adding and

















[q2 −q1] = θk [k2 −k1]+θq [q2 −q1], (B.2)
where θk =−φk /φθ and θq =−φq /φθ by applying the implicit theorem on Equation (8). The
assumption 2 together with (B.2) yields
f (θ(k2, q2,π))− f (θ(k1, q1,π)) > fθ[θ2 −θ1]
> fθθk [k2 −k1]+ fθθq [q2 −q1]. (B.3)
By setting k1 = 0 and q1 = 0, the inequality (B.3) becomes
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F (k2, q2,π) > Fk k2 +Fq q2 +F (0,0,π)
> Fk k2 +Fq q2.
Thus, F −Fk k
∗−Fq q
∗ > 0. Analogously, H −Hk k
∗−Hq q
∗. ■
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